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What is it like to be a child? Childness in the age of neuroscience

The title of this article alludes to the famous work that cognitive studies inevitably return to, “What is it like to be a bat?” by Thomas Nagel (1974). The philosophical dilemma of cognition highlights that it is by definition impossible to penetrate another living organism's mind, whether the mind of a bat, an elephant, a chimpanzee - or a child. While it is possible to imagine what it might be like to be a bat, for instance, to fly, to hang upside down and to use echolocation, a bat's subjective perception is presumably so different from a human being's that it can never become a shared experience (see also Blackmore 2005, pp. 6-9). 
	Thus, we cannot access the consciousness of a bat, or a cat, or a rat, and we cannot even be sure that animals have consciousness, or whether some of them do while others don't. In 2012, a group of international scholars adopted The Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness, stating that all animals are sentient (Bekoff, 2012). While this is doubtless a decisive step for animal rights movement, from the philosophical point of view it is problematic. The most basic definition of consciousness includes the awareness of being sentient: does a bat know that it is a bat? Does a bat understand batness as a distinctive feature of selfhood? 
	This article is an attempt to consider alternatives to the established constructivist approaches to children's literature, initiated, among other scholars, by Karín Lesnik-Oberstein (1994) and strongly endorced by various directions of Critical Theory, such as feminist and queer studies, postcolonial studies or race theory. Instead, I would like to explore two relavitely recent areas of inquiry, cognitive poetics and evolutionary literary criticism, the latter particularly hostile toward constructivism, claiming instead that any study of literature and art must take biological aspects of human existence into consideration. My exploration does not imply that I subscribe to either direction without reservation; however, I do find it both valuable and desirable to approach children's literature from other angles than constructivism. It does not take me back to essentialism, that children's literature theory so promptly liberated itself from during early 1990s. Rather, it questions constructivism as the only possible approach to literature and hermeneutics as the only appropriate method. Thanks to cognitive science and evolutionary psychology, we know more today about both minds and bodies, and it would be reductive not to investigate new possibilities offered by these disciplines, paying particular attention to embodiment as the foremost source of our engagement with the world, whether real or fictional. Some areas of children's literature research where such focus on embodiment has already become prominent are ecocritism (Harding et al 2009; Cutter-Mackenzie et al, 2011; Curry 2013) and disability studies (Dunn 2015).
	Paradoxically, it needed going twenty years back to get inspiration for looking into the future. Re-reading Peter Hollindale's book Signs of Childness, I noticed a detail that had previously escaped my attention: childness, for Hollindale, includes the child's awareness of being a child: “A child is someone who believes on good grounds that his or her condition of childhood is not yet over” (1997, p. 30). This self-awareness, as I see it, is a key element in Hollindale's concept of childness, as opposed to childhood that is predominantly defined by adults' awareness, or “belief on good grounds” if you prefer, of a human being's condition of childhood. We have so far no reliable evidence that a bat knows that it is a bat, but do we have – and can we ever hope to have - evidence that a child knows that they are a child? Hollindale seems to claim that we do have such evidence, or at the very least, that we have strong reasons to assert that a child believes on good grounds that they are a child. And yet I feel that we cannot accept this stance without further considerations. 
	How can we as adults be able to make assumptions about a child's consciousness? How can we know what it is like to be a child? A typical affirmative argument on this matter will probably go along the lines of: while none of us has experience of being a bat, we all have experience of being a child. It can be argued that the unique quality and attraction of children's literature is its endeavour (not always successful) to convey a first-hand experience of childhood, ostensibly based on the treasure trove of authors' childhood memories. This purportedly makes children's literature different from other kinds of fiction based on alterities, where it has been questioned whether male authors are able (and entitled) to convey experiences of female characters, white authors to convey experiences of black characters, or able-bodied authors to convey experiences of disabled characters. Such argument is ambiguous, since all fictional experiences, childhood included, are cultural and aesthetic constructions, and while first-hand experience of age, gender, race, sexual orientation or disability may enhance artistic representation, it is not a decisive  prerequisite. Moreover, as contemporary cognitive narratology states, the main appeal of both writing and reading fiction is that it gives us access to other people's minds in a way impossible in real life. For instance, Lisa Zunshine claims that the reward of reading fiction is “our awareness of our 'trying on' mental states potentially available to us but at a given moment differing from our own” (2012, loc. 329-330; original emphasis). Suzanne Keen explains that fiction “provide[s] safe zones for readers' feeling empathy without experiencing a resultant demand on real-world action” (2008, loc. 350-351), while Blackey Vermeule puts it simply as: “We need to know what other people are like” (2010, p. xii). In case of children's literature, we may add the minds of animals, plants, toys, monsters, God and Death. Thus cognitive literary theory, summarising the multimillennial tradition of fiction, places itself in direct opposition to what cognitive science today takes for granted: other people's minds are inaccessible, even though experimental psychology employing fMRI is taking the first, cautious steps in making minds slightly more transparent. Moreover, some philosophers, such as Yuval Harari, question the very existence of a mind as separate from the brain, and the existence of consciousness as anything other than electrical and chemical processes in the brain (see Harari, 2016, pp. 123-154). While dualism goes all the way back to Descartes, contemporary brain research has added new dimensions to the flesh/spirit divide (see e.g. Damasio, 2006). 
	A paradox then. Science tells us that we can at best only access and assess our own consciousness, if there is any such thing at all. Literary studies tell us that fiction is an adequate tool to at least contemplate how other minds work. Psychologists are starting to acknowledge the importance of fiction for their understanding of the workings of the mind (see e.g. Oatley, 2011). In her insightful book Peter Pan and the Mind of J .M. Barrie, neuroscientist Rosalind Ridler states: “Literature and art have always been a primary source of psychological insight and writers and painters frequently bring to our attention the way things can be, so that we come to understand the world differently” (2016, p. 34). Literary studies, in turn, explore how cognitive functions such as attention, memory, imagination, prediction, inference, empathy are reflected in fiction and enable us to employ life-to-text and text-to-life strategies, that is, to bring our real-life experience to understanding fictional events and characters and to transfer our understanding of fictional events and characters onto real-life events and relationships (see Zunshine, 2006; Keen, 2008; Vermeule, 2010; Hogan 2011, 2012; see also Zunshine, 2015). Recent brain research demonstrates, albeit on a small scale and short term, that engaging with fiction enhances empathy and theory of mind, that is, capacity to understand what other people think and feel, both fictional characters and real flesh-and-blood people (see e.g. Djikic et al, 2013; Kidd and Castano, 2013; Black and Barnes, 2015; Burke et al, 2016; Kidd et al, 2016). Psychologist Keith Oatley suggests that fiction also strongly contributes to our social skills: “If fiction is the simulation of social worlds then, similar to people who improve their flying skills in a flight simulator, those who read fiction might improve their social skills” (2016, p. 619). It would seem that literary scholars have finally received justification for their academic pursuit from sceptical colleagues within natural and social sciences. We can with confidence claim that reading fiction is beneficial because it enhances our cognitive, emotional and social skills. Children's literature, then, might be a good implement for training children to become responsible and empathetic members of society.  
	Let us, however, return to the question of what it is like to be a child. As Peter Hollindale continually emphasises in his book, one inherent feature of children's literature is the age imbalance between its creators and readers (even though there admittedly exists a marginal field of children's books written by young writers or by children in collaboration with adults). From the cognitive perspective, I would word it more precisely as a cognitive-affective imbalance (redacted for anonymity), but it does not change the concept as such. Theoretically, this alterity should not present a more complicated issue than other alterities, already pointed out: that male writers can write persuasively about female characters' experience; that able-bodied writers can write persuasively about disabled characters' experience, and so on. I am therefore not questioning that adult writers can write persuasively about child characters' experiences, since we know that it is not only possible, but indeed frequently successful to the extent that adult audiences nowadays voraciously consume books that ostensibly target young readers. And, I would guess, precisely because of, rather than despite, the childness (as opposed to childishness) of these books. 
	What I am questioning is the assumption, implied if not directly expressed by Hollindale, that writers can write about a child's experience, moreover, have the prerogative to write about a child's experience because, since they once were children, a child's mind is accessible to them; that they know what it is like to be a child. My claim is that an adult writer knows hardly more about what it is like to be a child than what it is like to be a bat. This is because of the cognitive gap between an adult and a child, a gap that memory cannot bridge. I realise that it is a provocative statement for anyone reared within the constructivist paradigm, and several recent studies have, on the contrary, suggested that the child/adult binarity should be replaced by a continuum (for instance, Gubar, 2011; 2016). While it is doubtless impossible, and indeed pointless to insist on the existence of a clear boundary between childhood and adulthood, it is precisely Hollindale's concept of childness that proves helpful in theorising the issue, while cognitive and developmental psychology offers us a number of analytical tools to explore it.  
	Since I obviously have no qualifications in psychology, my argument is supported by authoritative sources, including Sarah-Jayne Blakemore and Uta Frith's The Learning Brain: Lessons for Education (2005), Usha Goswami's Cognitive Development: The Learning Brain (2007) and Michael Eysenck and Mark Keane's Cognitive Psychology: A Student's Handbook (2013). A human child is born with a very big cranium that causes its mother considerable pain during childbirth, but that is necessary to contain a very big brain (O'Shea, 2005, pp. 60-63). This brain is an extremely complex mechanism that within a short time after the child's birth must quickly fine-tune itself to adapt to the external circumstances and make sure to take the advantage of these to survive. For instance, a newborn baby's vocal cords and mouth resonator are prepared to replicate every sound, vowel and consonant, in every language spoken on earth, including extinct languages. By the time the baby learns to pronounce first real words in its ambient language(s), typically between 10 and 13 months, they lose the ability to distinguish and thus reproduce sounds from other languages (see e.g. Ambridge and Lieven, 2011, pp. 18-31). This happens because the brain demands humongous amounts of energy; 20% of all energy a human body receives from food and heat is used to support the brain, which includes maintaining all networks of paths that connect individual brain cells. Being an economical machine, the brain will not maintain the paths that it decides it will not need, instead closing them down. Because a young child's brain is extremely plastic, it is still possible in young age to recover lost paths and to learn a second or third language without effort, but the older the child gets, the more effort it takes to learn a new language and almost impossible to replicate sounds profoundly different from those of the native tongue.
	A learning brain keeps pruning trillions of connections between brain cells, that a newborn brain may potentially need, but that it may decide are unnecessary or unviable to maintain (see e.g. Blakemore and Frith, 2005; O'Shea, 2005). We could speculate that if a young child is exposed to music or storytelling, the brain will enhance the paths that support perception of these external factors. It will probably also support attention necessary to enjoy music and stories, and it will store emotional memories that make experience of music and stories pleasurable. If the “musical” and “storytelling” paths are not used, they will be closed down. There is no scientific evidence of such processes yet, but it does follow from what we know about brain development during childhood and adolescence. The external information flow of a young child is so vast that even the amazing human brain with its seemingly inexhaustible storage capacity must discard some of it. In doing so, the brain decides which facts and experiences are salient, that is, worth storing for future recall, and which are irrelevant and can be dismissed. As imaginatively shown in the movie Inside Out (Docter and Del Carmen, 2015), every now and then the brain inspects its storage and disposes of experience that hasn't been recalled for a while. 
	During adolescence, the brain goes through a major re-structuring (see e.g. Byrne, 2003; Blakemore and Frith, 2005). I prefer to avoid technical language and therefore refrain from discussing mylienation and other physiological processes; on a most basic level, the frequently used paths are cemented, while the less frequent are cut off. Because the cementing substance needs space, the pruning is substantial, in the range of several orders of magnitude. Again, as a speculation, we may surmise that if paths for associating poetry, or fairy tales, or classical music with pleasure, have not been maintained in childhood, they will be irretrievably lost. If imagination has not been trained through reading, listening, watching, playing, it will not be enforced as a valuable cerebral capacity. Imagination is frequently highlighted as a foremost token of childness. Yet even in the best of circumstances, a significant part of it will be sacrificed during adolescence in favour of other cognitive activities, such as prediction and decision-making, which are often  recognised as tokens of maturity. This fact does not contradict the centrality of socialisation and acculturation, but complements it.  
	But there are even more important signs of childness that the brain needs to negotiate, and one of these has to do with brain laterality. Today's brain research dismisses earlier beliefs of the clearly separated functions of the hemispheres: both hemispheres process verbal, visual, sensory and proprioceptive information, and both are essential for emotion as well as reason. In his ground-breaking study The Master and His Emissary: The Divided Brain and the Making of the Western World (2009) and the complementary long essay The Divided Brain and the Search for Meaning (2012) philosopher and psychologist Iain McGilchrist explains the implications of the distribution of cognitive functions between cerebral hemispheres. My summary is inevitably simplified, since the brain structure is substantially more complex than can be sketched in a few sentences and certainly does not adhere to any strict binarities. While a neuroscientist would find such categorisation too primitive, for the sake of my argument, the basic distribution of cerebral features is helpful. Thus, the right hemisphere is emotional, while the left is rational; the right is concrete, while the left is abstract; the right sees the whole in a context, while the left attends to details out of context; the right explores, while the left categorises; and, perhaps most relevantly, the right hemisphere prioritises freshness, novelty, change, plurality and ambiguity. Both are equally important in our perception of the world, yet each perceives the world differently. In the follow-up essay, McGilchrist summarises the difference as: “while the left hemisphere 's raison d'être is to narrow things down to certainty, the right hemisphere's is to open them up into possibility” (2012, loc. 151). I find the latter a perfect description of childness. McGilchrist's argument is that “[e]xplicitness kills, renders lifeless” (2012, loc. 180).
	Recent brain research, acknowledged in McGilchrist's studies, has shown that the hemispheres develop at a different pace and that in infanthood and childhood, the right hemisphere dominates over the left. Further, the right hemisphere has firmer connectivity with the more ancient and lower parts of the brain that manage immediate sensory perceptions and affective response to these, while the left hemisphere communicates better with the newer and higher parts, which support our analytical skills, abstract thinking and partially language. Psychologist and children's literature scholar Hugh Crago refers to the low, or ancient parts of the brain as “reptile”, the middle parts as “mammalian”, and the higher parts as “human” (2014, p. 7). While I find these labels, widely used in evolutionary psychology, problematic in their implication of human superiority, the categories as such are illuminating. A young child's brain is, in this sense, more “reptile” than “human”, that is, more immediate and intuitive than an adult's rational brain. It is probably even more “reptile”, more based on instinct, than the brain of a mammalian bat. Therefore, if we cannot understand the mammalian consciousness of a bat, how can we assume that we understand the “reptile” consciousness of a child?
	What are, then, the implications for adults' potential (mis)understanding of what it is like to be a child? If a child's right cerebral hemisphere is better developed, and if it is connected with the ancient brain that processes senses and emotions, it probably follows that the child perceives the world differently from the adult. Let us speculate what these differences might be, even though there is no conclusive evidence. Ostensibly, this hypothetical child shows more intuitive and less rational responses to external factors. A child connects to the environment and to other living organisms more emotionally and more immediately, without rationalising, without sorting people, animals and objects into categories, and, most important, as I see it, without trying to make sense of them. This is because the right hemisphere does not try to make sense, instead experiencing the world intuitively. “Making sense” has always been a priority in education (e.g. Bruner and Haste, 1987/2011; Matthews and Addleton, 1992); we assume that meaning-making, whether in real life or in engaging with fiction, is the ultimate goal of learning – but isn’t it a typically adult approach? Further, a child makes no distinction between the animate and the inanimate; they animate objects and anthropomorphise animals. A child experiences the world holistically; exploring rather than categorising. A child relies more on sensory perception than on verbal information. And not least, a child does not shun novelty, ambiguity or strangeness; a child believes in magic, wonder and the extraordinary. A child does not strive to distinguish between fact and fiction, pretence and reality (Goswami 2007: 285-336), and enjoys the world as it is. As we grow up, we gradually lose these qualities because the left hemisphere catches up and takes over. This process is evolutionarily determined and therefore inevitable. It seems, then, that as adults, we will never be able to perceive the world like we did when we were children, and the brain retains no memory of such perception. As adults, we lose childness, the quality of being a child. In his recent book Enlightenment Now: The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism, and Progress (2018) cognitive psychologist Steven Pinker argues that evolution, alongside entropy, is the worst adversary of humanity and that human activities covered broadly by the concept of culture counterbalance the evolutionary purpose aimed exclusively on reproduction. To do this, we need the skills supported by the left hemisphere: distinguishing between the real and the imaginary; thinking in abstract categories; making predictions and inferences; balancing egoism and altruism. Playfulness needs to be at least partially sacrificed to make room for reason. 
	Two skills are crucial in transition from childness to adultness: theory of mind and empathy. Theory of mind is the capacity to understand other people's thoughts, opinions, beliefs and intentions independently of one's own. In neurotypical children it emerges around the age of four (see e.g. Doherty, 2009). Prior to that, and occasionally after that, a child is self-centred, or as J. M. Barrie puts is, “gay and innocent and heartless” (p. 192). Barrie’s view is marked by typical Victorian nostalgia, but his observation is not entirely unfounded; it has an evolutionary reason: in order to survive, children need to be fully concentrated on their own needs, which include food and protection. A child has limited capacity for causality, prediction, problem-solving and decision-making; a child will always favour short-term goals and immediate gratification over long-term outcomes (Goswami, 2004, pp. 182-219, 294-333;  Goswami, 2007, pp. 377-398; Eysenck and Keane, 2013, pp. 457-568). From an adult perspective, these traits may be viewed as flaws, or perhaps as another example of nostalgic cuteness; but they are indelible components of childness. Even during adolescence, or maybe particularly during adolescence, a young person is likely to put their own interests before anyone else's. 




I will discuss a few more signs of childness that get transformed or lost as we age and mature cognitively and emotionally. In doing so I will try to reverse the usual way, that I have practiced myself, to present certain cognitive traits as limited or absent capacities (redacted). Instead, I will view them as valuable qualities inherent to childness, impossible to retain, and in the first place, impossible to experience in adulthood. Childness, as Hollindale defines it, is not a lack of adult skills and qualities; it is a set of qualities that we as adults have no labels for, since we are used to measure and evaluate things from our own perspective, by default. 
	A child's sense of space and place, direction and dimensionality, scale and proportion, is different from that of an adult (see Matthews and Addleton, 1992). This is not exclusively due to the fact that a child is physically smaller than an adult, but because these aspects of perception are primarily performed by the left cerebral hemisphere. As our brains are re-structured during adolescence, we “forget” how incredibly large the distance between two places was and how long it felt to get from place to place. We forget how we tried to squeeze a very large doll in a very small bed. We forget how it felt not to be able to understand the difference between right and left. A book full of childness may remind us: “Pooh looked at his two paws. He knew that one of them was the right, and he knew that when you had decided which of them was the right, then the other one was the left, but he never could remember how to begin”. The left hemisphere has the abstract knowledge, while the right hemisphere cannot embody it. 
	A child's sense of time is different from that of an adult (Piaget, 1969). A book full of childness says: “Once upon a time, a very long time ago now, about last Friday...” For a child, waiting for the next birthday or for Christmas is eternal: “Always winter and never Christmas”. For a child, a person of twenty is ancient. Any span of time beyond a child's age in inconceivable. Being left alone for just a few minutes is equal to being abandoned; returning after years, like Peter Pan, to find your playmate grown up, is incomprehensible. The past is irrelevant, the future is non-existent. Children's literature frequently conveys this singularity of perception by using present narrative tense. “The right hemisphere's world is present” (McGilchrist, 2012, loc. 211).
	Our daily rhythm is determined by the levels of various chemicals released by the brain into our bodies that regulate our energy and tell us when we need to rest and sleep. This biopsychological fact is cemented in culture by routines and habits necessary for societies to function. When young children don't want to go to bed it is because their brains haven't yet learned to follow the daily rhythm of light and darkness. A child simply falls asleep when they are tired and wakes up when they are rested, much to parents' irritation. For an adult, the chemical process works on a 24-hours basis, once again, enhanced by socially constructed patterns of daily life. The rhythm is disturbed when we travel across several time zones; we call it jet lag. Because of hormonal disruptions, an adolescent's daily rhythm works on a 25-hours basis, which means that every day a teenager's chemical balance is shifted by an hour against the actual clock. Teenagers live with a perpetual jet lag (Bainbridge, 2009, pp. 114-118). In neurotypical adults, the daily rhythm is regulated both biologically and socially.  We forget what it was like to be out of sync. We accuse teenagers of being lazy. 
	A child's understanding of causality and entropy is different. It is not at all surprising for a child that time can run backwards, or that broken objects can become whole, or that dead people can become alive. Children may have difficulties understanding the consequences of their own and other people's actions; we can say that they are irresponsible, but but often, in the West at least, children’s carefreeness has been perceived romantically as unlimited freedom; they have been viewed as  free; able fully practice their free will unrestricted by the adult system of beliefs and values; unencumbered by the sense of right and wrong.Yet in other respects adults have sought to curtail that apparent freedom, labelling it undesirable, and trying to socialise children   and make them abandon the habit of judging their own and other people's actions from a self-centred position. (Obviously, this nostalgic view of childhood freedom is by necessity exclusive of those children who do not have the privilege to roam around and be carefree; that in societies where children work, for instance, there is no social expectation that they should display that freedom) 
	We can say that a child has limited real-life experience, including the experience of time and space, social structures and interpersonal relationships (Bruner and Haste, 2011; Goswami, 2004, pp. 2-73, 108-145; Goswami, 2007, pp. 213-238). But in exchange, for a child everything is new and unfamiliar; the right hemisphere favours novelty, and  everything is “for the very first time.” Can we as adults really know what it is like to see or do something ordinary for the first time? And nothing is really ordinary for a child. 
	We can say that a child has less developed attention, which is not merely an important cognitive skill, but is also necessary for successful social interaction (Eysenck and Keane, 2013, pp. 153-202). Yet lack of attention can also be described as unsatiable curiosity. A child has a less developed memory to process, store, retrieve and reconnect lived and mediated experience (Goswami, 2004, pp. 250-293; Goswami, 2007, pp. 347-376; Eysenck and Keane, 2013, pp. 203-326). The narrator of Peter Pan, therefore, is not wrong to label the “happy forgetfulness” as a quality of childness; the values and beliefs children’s literature has associated to childhood are not devoid of grounding in biological fact. A child has not yet developed a clear sense of self; children are solipsistic, and their capacity of self-reflection is limited (Dusek and McIntyre, 2003). Yet under-developed sense of self implies a range of unrealised potentials: as the yet unsettled daemon playing with many possible identities. As we grow up, our daemons become fixed, and we lose the potential to become something else. The incompleteness, in Bakhtinian sense (Bakhtin, 1981), the mouldability, corresponding to the plasticity of the brain, is what makes a child a child, and what we as adults can imagine, but never take part of. 
	What becomes quite obvious through brief reflections on these biological, physiological and neurological observations is that a child's experience of the perceptible world as well as of their own interiority is so profoundly detached from that of an adult that it is hardly feasible to claim that an adult has first-hand knowledge of this experience. A child's mind is just as unknowable as a bat's.
And yet, just like many mainstream writers have successfully managed to portray the consciousness of various outgroups, children's literature has managed to capture some of the enigmas of a child's mind. The achievement is all the more extraordinary; and instead of saying, as constructivists might, that children’s literature moulds or manipulates childhood, we could say that it is quite remarkable that adults have in fact been able to spot aspects of children’s perceptions that they have distilled in their works. 

The (im)persistence of memory
 
But what about the treasure trove of childhood memories? Unfortunately, there is not much scientific evidence for it either. In her work on re-memorying, Alison Waller claims that it is possible for adults to reconstruct childhood reading experience (Waller 2017). However, while this methodology is arguably applicable to reading, where one can check recollections of a text against the text itself, there is no way of checking the (in)accuracy of memory against actual events, and still less the accuracy of emotional involvement with these events. Contemporary memory research, building on neuroscience, leaves no doubt about the reliability of episodic memory, that is, long-term memory that preserves our real-life experience, unlike semantic memory that deals with factual knowledge (see e.g. Schacter, 1997; Baddeley, 1999; Tulving and Craik,1999; Foster, 2009; Whitehead, 2009). Memory, as a cognitive function based on chemical and electrical processes in the brain, does not render an event or an emotion as it was experienced, but rather as it was encoded and stored when transferred from short-term to long-term memory (O'Shea 2005, pp. 84-101). Unlike semantic memories that can be verified, episodic memories are “personal, highly selective, idiosyncratic, and probably false” (O'Shea, 2005, p. 88). The rational left cerebral hemisphere, trying to make sense of the emotionally charged experience accumulated by the right hemisphere, tries to sort it into pre-determined categories, to make it coherent, to transform it into a properly structured, linear narrative rather than a non-narrative, non-linear, multisensory whole. That is, even before a memory of a mental state is stored, it is already completely transformed by the left hemisphere’s processing. In his insightful book Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow (2016), macrohistorian and philosopher Yuval Harari refers to this split perception as the impenetrable barrier between the experiencing and the narrating self, in which the latter, the left hemisphere, is at best a deluded fabricator, at worst, a deliberate liar (pp. 342-348). Thus, a memory is never authentic, but always distorted, reflecting individual subjective perception and external circumstances, which can be easily proved if two people's sets of memories of the same event are compared. Through fMRI, neuroscientists have identified parts of the brain where false memories are stored (O'Shea, 2005, p. 27). 
	Against the background of memory research, the romanticised view of so-called authentic childhood memories, whether idyllic or traumatic, becomes highly contestable. They are not genuine recollections, but complete confabulations. The concept of confabulation implies that an author who would claim to write from memory honestly believes that the memory is accurate. The author's position, then, corresponds to the position of the rational left hemisphere that endeavours to organise the chaotic empirical experience into a logical narrative; “[i]t is demonstrably self-deceiving, and confabulates - makes up a story, when it cannot understand something, and tells it with conviction” (McGilchrist, 2012, loc. 384). To maintain that children's literature utilises memory-based child perspective is an illusion. Authors may possibly be able to recall superficial events (episodic memory, unreliable in itself), but not the emotional states evoked by these (cf. Hogan, 2003, pp. 159-162). To suggest that the success of children's literature depends on authors' acute memories of their own childhood is cognitively untenable. These “memories” are just as much a construction as any other fiction, even if they are supported by diaries or other documents; and they are most likely based on the nostalgic view of childhood, on “self-induced emotional states of longing for the past” (Nalbantian, 2003, p. 41). In other words, authors  who make that kind of allegation are trying to reach for the unreacheable childness. 
	The attraction of returning to childhood experience is understandable. Cognitive critic Patrick Hogan refers to memory-based fiction as “recuperative creativity” (Hogan, 2003, p. 78), that is, attempts to recover what was lost in the left hemisphere's systematisation of experience, instead capturing the right hemisphere's spontaneous response. This attitude echoes, albeit in a more positive tone, the definition of children's literature as self-therapy for frustrated adults, as suggested by Jacqueline Rose (1984). Yet, as I have repeatedly pointed out in my research, cognitive narratologists' arguments do not take young readers' cognitive asymmetry into consideration (Redacted for anonymity). For Hogan and other scholars, “recuperative creativity” implies that the reader, adult by default, is atuned with the author's endeavours because these reflect their own attempts to access their lost childness. For a childly reader, however, recuperation is irrelevant. Their childness is intact, and therefore their pursuit is to recognise and connect with the childness of the fictional child or, more broadly, the childness of the book. 
	The dilemma of children's literature thus becomes two-fold. Firstly, we have an adult writer attempting to create a fictional alien, that is, a childly mind. Secondly, we have an ostensibly childly reader attempting to understand, or model, as a cognitive critic would call the process (Stockwell and Mahlberg, 2015), a fictional childly mind created by an alien, un-childly mind. The former case, I would argue, is less complicated than children's literature scholars have made it so far (e.g. Nodelman, 2008; Nikolajeva, 2010). The childness of a fictional child is not radically different from the batness of a fictional bat – for instance, Randall Jarrell's The Bat-Poet (1967) - or the otherness of any fictional other. Moreover, the childness of a child in children's fiction is not radically different from the childness of a child in fiction targeting adult audiences, because it is based on a set of qualities, as Hollindale defines childness, of being a child, including awareness of being a child. Both are equally unknowable for the writer, as I have argued. The latter case, however, that is, an actual child mind-modelling a fictional child created by an adult, is indeed unique for interactions between texts and readers.  
	It can of course be pointed out that while we cannot ask a bat how it perceives its batness, we can ask a child how they perceive their childness. Yes with our current understanding of the learning brain and its limited ability of self-reflection, I would not with confidence rely on such evidence. Let us therefore return to the question of whether a child is aware of being a child and what the consequences are for the childness of children's literature. The fictional child that readers encounter in any kind of books is created by adult writers' imagination and unreliable memories that can also be memories in second or third degree, for instance, through factual or fictional stories. For an adult reader, the experience of mind-modelling a fictional child, whether the book targets young or adult audience, is modelling an alien mind, a childly mind. Once again, this experience is not radically different from modelling any alien mind. 
	For a childly reader, modelling a fictional childly mind may or may not be a recognisable experience. Since it is an experience mediated through the non-childly adult writer, the success of such mind-modelling does not depend on the parity of the reader and the character. For a childly reader, too, the mind of the fictional child is just as familiar or unfamiliar as the mind of a bat or, if you wish, an adult. If the writer uses imagination to create childness, the childly reader uses imagination to read childness. The childness of the childly reader does not necessarily make them better equipped to engage with the childness of the character. Yet I am prepared to admit that the childly reader's awareness of being a child can be beneficial for connecting with the child character, or rather a childly character, since the character does not have to be a child: it can be a bat. Or a cat. Or a rat. As in Philip Pullman's I Was a Rat! (1999). 
	However, the childness of the book, as Hollindale defines it, is radically different in a text with a projected young audience or even dual or multiple audience. Hollindale offers a wide repertoire of signs of childness in a children's book, most of which have, since the study was published, been thoroughly investigated (see, for instance, Bradford, 2007; Mallan, 2008; Waller 2011; Carroll, 2012;  Sainsbury, 2013; Trites, 2014; Dunn, 2015; Jaques 2015). I am not suggesting that children's literature scholarship has accomplished Hollindale's agenda, not least because the complexity of childhood as investigated by related areas, such as psychology, sociology, disability studies or critical race theory, brings in new aspects to the childness of children's literature that need to be explored. Yet we are closer today to the understanding of childness of the book than we were twenty years ago. I will therefore not dwell any further on Hollindale's categories, but being a book person rather a child person, I would like to emphasise that a genuinely childly text contains potential for being understood and enjoyed by a childly reader; a potential that may or may not be realised by every reader who engages with the book. It is therefore extremely difficult and possibly pointless to generalise, claiming that this text is more childly than that text, just as it is pointless to claim that this child is more childly than that child. 
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